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Thirty experts from a range of institutions gathered in Ottawa, 
Canada, on May 30, 2005, for a policy roundtable titled "Delivering 
on the Responsibility to Protect in Africa". Co-hosted by The North- 
South Institute (NSI-Canada), the Centre d'Alerte et de Prevention 
des Conflits (CENAP-Burundi), the Development Policy Management 
Forum (DPMF-Ethiopia) and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS- 
South Africa), this meeting provided a timely opportunity to review 
progress towards the protection of African civilians at risk of massive 
human rights violations. It also offered a forum to explore policy 
options for a range of stakeholders and actors including the African 
Union (AU), Canada, the United Nations and the broader international 
community. In addition to the host organizations, participants included 
Canadian officials from several departments and policy analysts from 
Africa, Canada, Europe and the United States. 
The first part of this policy brief summarizes five themes around which 
discussions converged, without attribution to particular participants 
since the roundtable was off-the-record. The second part sets out a 
series of policy recommendations for the international community and 
particularly for Canada, building on the roundtable and on The North- 
South Institute's earlier work in this area. These recommendations are 
a work-in-progress: over the coming years we will update them in part- 
nership with CENAP, DPMF, ISS and other institutions including the 
Netherlands Institute for International Affairs (Clingendael) and the 
UK Institute for Public Policy Research. 
The roundtable and related outputs were made possible by finan- 
cial support from the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC), the Carnegie Corporation of New York and Foreign 
Affairs Canada, as well as core funding to NSI from the Canadian 
International Development Agency. The contents of this brief 
are only attributable to NSI and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of these partners and fenders. 
African tragedies, international failures 
The historical backdrop to the discussions of emerging 
African capacities to protect civilians at risk of grave 
human rights violations is the failure of the international 
community to respond appropriately to tragedies such as 
the collapse of the Somali state, genocide in Rwanda, recur- 
rent war in Angola and Sierra Leone, protracted conflict in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the current crisis in 
The Responsibility to Protect in Africa 
Participants noted that the notion of the "responsibility to protect" 
(R2P) has made considerable advances in recent years. In 2001 the 
International Commission on Intervention and States Sovereignty 
(ICISS) cogently argued that sovereign states and the international 
community have a responsibility to protect populations at risk of 
grave human rights violations, to rebuild war-affected societies and 
above all to prevent severe violations and deadly conflict. The 
Commission laid out a framework for international action when states 
fail to live up to their responsibilities to protect citizens, including 
principles for the use of force in extreme circumstances. The 
Commission's report sets a high bar for military intervention: the cri- 
teria to prompt a military response include large-scale violence and 
large-scale ethnic cleansing. 
However, as one roundtable participant noted, by stressing the inter- 
national community's collective responsibilities at different phases of 
conflict, R2P actually lowers the threshold for "paying attention" to 
emerging crises. Key ICISS recommendations were taken up by the UN 
High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004, and 
were endorsed by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's In Larger 
Freedom Report. Canadian officials thought there might be enough 
votes to obtain endorsement of these principles at or shortly after 
the UN Millennium Review Summit in September 2005. This 
endorsement may ultimately help limit the discretionary space of 
the United Nations to remain indecisive in the face of large-scale 
human rights violations. 
Rising to the challenges of timely protection 
The experience in Burundi illustrates one of the 
quandaries facing the AU. Its capacities for the timely use 
of force in crisis situations are only being developed. The 
ASF is not slated to be fully operational before 2010, 
and even this is an ambitious timeline. Yet partici- 
k pants noted that in the absence of timely and effec- 
Darfur. Several participants suggested that 
the inability and/or unwillingness of either 
the United Nations or a number of African 
institutions to protect Africans in these situa- 
tions shattered illusions of a post-Cold War 
peace dividend and prompted many to 
search for new protection mechanisms. 
Several presenters noted the even more dra- 
matic evolution of African norms in recent 
years. The NSI background paper docu- 
mented the codification of responsibility to 
protect principles in the 2002 Constitutive 
Act and in subsequent African Union docu- 
ments. African participants added to the 
paper's explanation of new AU structures, 
such as the already-established Peace and 
Security Council and the emerging African 
Standby Force (ASF). They explained how 
the ASF will build on the emerging capabili- 
ties of certain regional economic communi- 
ties, particularly the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). They noted plans to link this emerg- 
ing structure to other mechanisms including 
the Continental Early Warning System 
(CEWS), the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM) and the New Partnership for Africa's 
Development (NEPAD). They described 
opportunities and challenges faced by the 
African Union's stabilization force in 
Burundi and its recent engagement in 
Darfur. 
tive UN responses, key African leaders and 
other members of the international commu- 
nity believe that the AU must take action. 
This is the logic that led the AU to deploy 
AMIB and to seek a mandate for ceasefire 
monitoring and civilian protection in 
Darfur. The difficulty in obtaining the con- 
sent of the host state for the latter and the 
challenges of persuading Khartoum to agree 
to the deployment of a large force of armed 
observers highlight the enduring ability of 
relatively strong AU member states to use 
state sovereignty to slow down timely inter- 
national protection. It also underscores the 
requirement for the international commu- 
nity to remain engaged in large scale 
humanitarian emergencies. Yet the AU and 
key African states' willingness to push the 
envelope on protection in Darfur, and the 
support they received from donors, NATO 
and the EU from mid-2005 onwards, suggests 
that the AU might be able to deliver on its 
responsibility to protect in due course and 
with sufficient international support. 
The difficulties in responding to the crises in 
Burundi and Darfur highlight another chal- 
lenge facing AU protection operations, 
namely their reliance on regional economic 
communities (RECs). One problem is that 
most RECs are only beginning to organize as 
coherent entities and have a long way to go 
to develop mechanisms for security coopera- 
tion. Another is that external assistance 
tends to favour some regions over others- 
notably western and southern Africa. One 
African participant suggested that this aggra- 
vates the mismatch between the RECs and 
the AU on security and other matters. Others 
suggested that donors should support the 
development of the RECs' peace and security 
capacities in a manner that ties them into, 
rather than draws them away from, the AU. 
After unsuccessful attempts to obtain a UN Security Council mandate to 
deploy a peace support operation to monitor and verify a partial ceasefire, in 
April 2003 the AU deployed the African Mission in Burundi (AMIS). AMIS aug- 
mented and transformed the 700 South African troops who had been 
deployed in 2001 to protect political leaders during the transition. 
Due to resource and capacity constraints, and above all ongoing warfare, AMIB 
was only partly able to implement its mandate to observe the ceasefire, initi- 
ate the demobilization of combatants and protect civilians at risk. Yet several 
roundtable participants suggested that AMIB did play a crucial role in laying 
the foundations for a more comprehensive peace accord and for its verifica- 
tion by the follow-on UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). 
ONUB's deployment in June 2004 built on AMIB's resources and initial con- 
tributions. Deployed with significantly more resources and at a more 
advanced stage in the peace process, ONUB has helped expand the space for 
elections and peacebuilding. Yet participants suggested that severe human 
rights violations continue and that the elections could paradoxically under- 
mine democratic consolidation. They also suggested that the government and 
the international community are only beginning to address longer-term peace- 
building challenges such as truth, justice and national reconciliation, secu- 
rity sector reform and poverty reduction. It is not clear if the AU or other 
African institutions will play significant roles in aspects of peacebuilding 
where financial resources are key. 
By late 2004 it became clear that despite the escalation of war and the mas- 
sive increase in human rights violations, the UN would not be able/willing to 
deploy a protection force in Darfur due to opposition by Khartoum and by a 
number of other African leaders, as well as to divisions within the Security 
Council. Against that backdrop the AU, which obtained a mandate to moni- 
tor the ceasefire in April 2004, deployed 300 observers and pressed for an 
expanded mandate. In October 2004 the AU decided to expand the African 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to 3,320 personnel. 
In 2005 the international community significantly increased its support for 
AU efforts. By April 2005 its pledges to AMIS amounted to US$248 million. 
By June this included offers of airlift support and headquarters and intelli- 
gence training from NATO and the EU. In early 2005 the UN Security Council 
passed several resolutions expanding sanctions on the government and refer- 
ring the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. 
According to African participants, though this has led to a "remarkable" 
expansion of AMIB's deployment, the protection situation may have only 
modestly improved on the ground, and ceasefire violations continue on a 
regular basis. Moreover the AU and the broader international community 
have only begun to initiate planning for postwar peacebuilding in Darfur and 
for African contributions to those processes. 
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Delivering on the broader R2P agenda 
Although they aspire to play roles along the entire pre- 
vention-reaction-rebuilding continuum, African institu- 
tions face huge challenges in implementing their commit- 
ments to this broader R2P agenda. In Burundi the UN took 
over from the AU once conditions were somewhat stabilized, 
and there are no clear roles contemplated for African institu- 
tions in helping Burundi tackle peacebuilding challenges such 
as security sector reform or poverty reduction. Although the AU 
is positioning itself to contribute to peacebuilding in southern 
Sudan and possibly in Darfur, several participants voiced skepti- 
cism over whether the AU would actually play meaningful roles in 
peacebuilding and whether these would be based on the organiza- 
tion's comparative advantages. 
Addressing other challenges 
Participants flagged several other major challenges facing efforts to 
deliver on the responsibility to protect in Africa. These include: 
Tensions between R2P and the tradition of solidarity among African 
ruling elites. Some African participants suggested that the "norm 
of mutual protection by ruling elites is still stronger than emerging 
norms on protecting civilians." 
The possibility that strengthening African military protection 
capacities could tip fragile civil-military balances in certain coun- 
tries. Any increases in military institutions' capacities in Africa 
must be linked to proportionate investments to make security 
forces democratically accountable to civilian authorities. 
The enormous challenge of integrating gender considerations 
into African R2P efforts. This has begun in AMIB and AMIS, but 
much more could be done to integrate gender considerations 
into peace operations, peacebuilding and conflict prevention, 
as per UN Security Council Resolution 1325. 
At present the AU's agenda is driven largely by the leadership 
and resources of a few key African states, and African troop 
contributors are nearing the end of their capacity. 
A new international division 
ibour? 
Some participants highlighted the potential 
emergence of a sequential model whereby 
the AU is the first on the scene, either in 
support of a peace process or to provide 
front-end stabilization forces, the UN leads 
multi-dimensional peace operations once 
comprehensive peace accords are reached, 
and larger international donors play lead 
roles in key peacebuilding tasks such as 
demobilization, governance reforms and 
economic reconstruction. 
Participants agreed that a "new interna- 
tional division of labour" that seeks to rel- 
egate African institutions (and African 
troops) to the most dangerous roles 
upfront, leaving less front-line military 
operations to NATO or the UN, and more 
complex peacebuilding tasks to Northern- 
dominated institutions such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
may be problematic. Is this an appropriate 
division of responsibilities, they asked, 
when African soldiers put their lives-and 
the lives of the people they are meant to 
protect-at risk in difficult circumstances 
with inadequate resources only to hand 
control over to better-resourced organiza- 
tions once conditions have stabilized? 
Where would this division of labour leave 
the AU's vision of contributing to the con- 
tinuum of reaction-peacebuilding and pre- 
vention? Where would it leave other African 
institutions such as the African Commission 
for Human and Peoples' Rights on gover- 
nance issues, or the African Development 
Bank on economic reconstruction processes? 
m POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1 Normative frameworks for The Res onsibility to Protect in Africa 
There is a need to develop a common 
understanding and universal doctrine in 
the United Nations, the African Union, 
the regional economic communities, 
other regional organizations and key 
states surrounding the "protection of 
civilians" and how protection tasks might 
be carried out in specific contexts. 
Canada and other governments that sup- 
port The Responsibility to Protect should 
more consistently frame this evolving 
concept as a continuum of protection 
that links prevention, reaction and 
rebuilding priorities when advocating its 
endorsement in international forums. 
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The formulation of R2P as a broad spectrum of responsibilities that 
bridge crisis response and transformative peacebuilding aligns more 
closely with African peace, security and development priorities. This 
framing, also rooted in the KISS report, may help allay concerns in the 
South that R2P is merely a legitimizing doctrine for interventions based 
on narrow Northern-driven agendas. 
In order to deliver on this broad responsibilities agenda, Canada and 
other key members of the international community should assist the AU 
in promoting its integrated conception of the responsibility to prevent, 
react and rebuild among Member States and other actors. Canada and 
like-minded governments can help the AU promote political will across 
the protection continuum through bilateral policy dialogue, as well as 
through key international forums such as the G-8 and the UN. 
Helping Africans Put R2P into practice 
Engaged members of the international 
community should assist the AU and the 
regional economic communities in the 
African Standby Force's peacekeeping 
capacities while also paying close atten- 
tion to developing the ASF's capacity to 
undertake non-peacekeeping tasks like 
observation and monitoring, preventive 
deployment, and post-conflict disarma- 
ment and demobilization. 
The international community should 
assist the AU and other African institu- 
tions in developing an on-going best 
practices and lessons-learned capacity on 
peacekeeping so that the AU and the 
RECs do not need to "reinvent the wheel" 
when/if they are forced to respond to 
future Burundi- or Darfur-like crises. 
The AU and donors, including Canada, 
should also support strengthening the 
capacity of African research institutions 
to provide analysis of conflict situations 
and evidence-based policy recommendations to the African Union, the 
RECs, the United Nations and other actors. 
Canada and other donors need to strike a better balance between build- 
ing African peace support operations and crisis response capacities, and 
providing sufficient resources to develop the AU's and other African 
institutions' capabilities for conflict prevention and post-conflict recon- 
struction, including reconciliation. To support this broader peace, secu- 
rity and development agenda, Canada and other donors should: 
Make developing the AU's conflict prevention capacities a central 
objective of assistance. In particular, donors could support the 
African Union in developing a road map for conflict prevention that, 
like the road map for the operationalization of the ASF, sets out clear 
tasks and timelines to develop the AU's conflict prevention and reso- 
lutions mechanisms. 
Assist the AU in finding better ways of raising issues of conflict pre- 
vention at the level of the Peace and Security Council. In particular, 
donors could offer greater support to the Political Affairs 
Department of the African Union. To date the majority of donor 
assistance to the AU for conflict prevention, management, and reso- 
lution has been channeled to the Peace and Security Department. 
While this support is important, the Political Affairs Department will 
continued.. 
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2. Helping Africans put R2Pinto Practice (continued) 
play a critical role in conflict prevention. 
Moreover, it houses the Special Representative for 
the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, a posi- 
tion that requires additional financial and political 
support to fulfill assigned duties. 
Focus on developing the early warning capacities of 
regional organizations and building in mechanisms to 
link these focal points at the African Union. 
Provide greater assistance to the courts and commissions 
that support the AU's peace, security and development 
agenda but remain outside of the African Union. For exam- 
ple, with even relatively modest resources, Canada could 
make a significant contribution to strengthening linkages 
between the AU system and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples' Rights based in the Gambia. 
3 ONUB and beyond in Burundi 
The UN Operation in Burundi should play a more robust role in 
providing meaningful protection to civilians under threat of physi- 
cal violence and in actively deterring human rights violations, with 
particular attention to the rights of women and girls. 
The UN Security Council must ensure that it follows through on 
its commitments to remain engaged in Burundi over the long- 
term, through ONUB and other mechanisms, since the post 
electoral political situation, the challenges of resettling refugees 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs), enduring poverty and 
the proliferation of arms may fuel protracted violence. 
Donors need to start releasing their development pledges to 
Burundi, even in the context of continued fighting and 
delayed transitional processes. Donor commitments to 
Burundi could be directed toward poverty reduction initia- 
tives and governance reforms that advance the priorities of 
local and national agents of change, including women and 
women's groups. For example, donors could support the 
country's community recovery program that will build 
schools and clinics in some of the most marginalized 
communities, assist the formulation of conflict-sensitive 
land policy reforms, and help build the capacity of the 
national government in these and other critical 
sectors. 
Offer support to the African Union's 
post-conflict reconstruction agenda 
through the AU's proposed Ministerial 
Committee on post-conflict recon- 
struction and harmonize this with sup- 
port for NEPAD's Peace and Security 
Committee. 
Develop a better understanding of the 
current performance and future 
requirements of the African Peer 
Review Mechanism, and find ways to 
channel greater technical and finan- 
cial support to this mechanism. 
Canada and other donors need to strike 
the right balance between supporting 
minimalist reforms, or "good enough 
governance" in fragile states like 
Burundi, with the pressing need also to 
address some of the most politically and 
socially contentious issues (e.g. inequali- 
ties of power and wealth along ethnic, 
race, gender or class lines) that often lie 
at the root of violent conflict. By support- 
ing multi-stakeholder policy dialogue, 
donors can help interested parties keep 
structural issues on the agenda as well as 
devise realistic timeframes for addressing 
such issues through reforms. 
4 AMIS and beyond in Darfh 
The international community, including 
Canada, will need to provide financial 
and other resources to help the AU 
expand its deployment in Darfur. African 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) requires air 
transport capacity, helicopter gunships, 
armoured personnel carriers, sophisti- 
cated intelligence gathering capability, 
communication equipment, as well as 
planning and mission management 
capacity. Canada needs to ensure that its 
May 2005 commitment to AMIS meets 
these and other requirements identified 
by the African Union. Canada can also 
use its position as a significant supporter 
of AMIS to persuade other donors to con- 
tribute meaningfully and over the long- 
term to a larger deployment. Canada can 
contribute to helping the AU reassess its 
mandate in order to strengthen its pro- 
tection and ceasefire enforcement provi- 
sions should the situation deteriorate. 
The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) needs 
to coordinate more closely with AMIS. 
UNMIS, which will monitor the compre- 
hensive peace agreement negotiated 
between the Government of Sudan and 
the Sudan People's Liberation 
Movement (SPLM), will need to find ways 
of sharing its resources and expertise 
with AMIS. The UN also needs to begin 
working in partnership with the AU and 
other key local, national and interna- 
tional stakeholders to plan for the future 
of Darfur. 
Canada and other members of the international community need to 
apply greater pressure on all parties to the conflict to respect the cease- 
fire and humanitarian law. They should press the Government of Sudan 
to live up to its commitments to protect civilians and to allow AMIS to 
expand its mandate to protect civilians and fully enforce the ceasefire, 
should this be necessary in the future. Finally, Canada and others need 
to use diplomatic and financial levers to ensure that the main parties to 
the conflict fully engage in political negotiations to bring an end to the 
conflict and chart a course for building lasting peace in Darfur. 
To make an immediate contribution to peace in Darfur, Canada should 
support policy research that could illuminate options for immediate 
engagement and research to inform a long-term strategy for sustainable 
peacebuilding. A logical starting point would be to commission a scop- 
ing study consolidating the insights of the best research on the conflict 
and conflict transformation options in Darfur. That survey may high- 
light the need for further policy research on issues like: 
The historical causes of conflict and the contemporary political 
economy of warfare in Darfur in a sub-regional context. 
Options for peace-making: how the Comprehensive Peace Agree- 
ment could be extended to Darfur, how the armed movements could 
be assisted in transforming themselves into political actors, and what 
support the AU might require to enhance its mediation in the 
conflict. 
The dimensions of internal displacement and options for the volun- 
tary resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), including 
dealing with their legitimate claims to confiscated land. 
A survey of local government capacities to provide basic public goods 
such as public security, justice and conflict management, education 
and health including trauma counseling. This survey or set of studies 
could examine how local authorities can complement the mandates 
of national institutions and the contributions of local civil society, 
including traditional authorities, to peacebuilding. 
v A baseline survey on the state of rural development and the poten- 
tial for reviving and transforming the local agricultural economy. 
A study looking at how the African Union and other African institu- 
tions may play a role in assisting with post-conflict reconstruction in 
Darfur and other marginalized areas of Sudan. 
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5 The African Union and the regional economic communities 
Donors, including Canada, can play an important role in assisting the AU and 
the RECs in formalizing their relationship in ways that draw on comparative 
advantages and advance the R2P agenda in Africa without exacerbating compe- 
tition between the regions. Donors should: 
I 
Ensure that support channeled bilaterally and to the RECS does not under- 
mine the AU's strategic framework. 
Support normatively consistent approaches to R2P among the RECs and 
between the RECS and the AU. 
Channel support to RECs with less developed peace and security mecha- 
nisms, provided they demonstrate clear commitments to advancing a R2P 
agenda and rigorously respecting universal human rights standards in their 
own activities. 
Explore mechanisms that could advance collaboration between the AU and 
the RECs such as: staff exchanges; joint training for planners, force 
commanders, and support elements; joint initiatives in the areas of peace- 
making, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, joint needs assessment 
missions, etc. 
6 The African Union and the United Nations 
Canada and other engaged actors should encourage the United Nations 
Security Council to pass a resolution to provide meaningful support to the 
RECs, the ASF and the AU's other peace and security mechanisms. 
Canada and other donors can help formalize the relationship between the 
African Union and the United Nations by supporting the drafting a 
Memorandum of Understanding for the sharing of assets like information, 
airlift, personnel and possibly financial resources. 
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